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Abstract
This article examines university liability created by internship and consulting relationships.  Business clients participating in outreach relation-
ships formulate performance expectations based on perceptions of experience and / or qualifications.  Clients assign tasks accordingly, and the
university incurs liability that is conditioned by business clients’ expectations.  Substantial liability is related to unusually large and rare unfa-
vorable outcomes in the outreach engagement, known as tail events.  Tail events can significantly and negatively impact the client. Both the
liability for and the probability of tail events increase as universities continue to expand business outreach activities.  As internship and consult-
ing engagements increase, the probability of a tail event also increases. The responsibilities of IT intern engagements and potential liability of the
sponsoring university are analyzed.  The university is the primary insurer for the client and indemnifies its representatives.  All internship en-
gagements should be formalized by written contract.  An example contract is attached.
Keywords: University liability, Consulting, Internship, Intern, Information Technology, Contract, Outreach
Introduction
A student intern at a large communications company is given
access to the company’s data collection software and acci-
dentally damages a critical systems software component,
disrupting vital communications and customer services for
several hours.  Another intern at a small glass products
manufacturer inadvertently pushes a piece of heavy equip-
ment into a row sliding glass doors, costing the company
nearly $60,000 in ruined product and slowing deliveries.
Still another, who is assigned to program critical system
modules at a large petroleum firm, falters in his assignment
and then conceals results of his failure until after the intern-
ship is over and he is gone, adversely affecting production
and delivery schedules which result in losses exceeding
$150,000.  These examples are of real events precipitated by
student interns and observed by the authors--all which had
significant adverse effects on the companies that employed
the interns.  Faculty consultants have been responsible for
similar debacles.
Sponsored internships and consulting engagements, particu-
larly those that are related to Information Systems (IS) and
Information Technology (IT), are dramatically increasing in
importance and number throughout the United States.  For
example, the National Association of Colleges and Employ-
ers reported that 61 percent of their survey respondents offer
summer student internship programs, after which nearly half
of these interns were offered full-time positions (HR Focus
1997).   Another research organization found that nearly 80
percent of the firms surveyed employed student interns
throughout the year (Sweeney 1997).  Still another reported
that 98 percent use internships to screen for possible perma-
nent employees (Frazee 1997).  Of these same firms, 70
percent required new hires either to have had internships, or
some other form of on-the-job-training.  Actual work expe-
rience, which includes internships, was ranked second only
to academic major as an interview screening criterion for
college hires.
In addition, national trends indicate faculty internships and
consultancies are also on the rise (Melinda Norris 1996).
Directly correlating with that trend, most IS/IT employers in
this area also offer opportunities to university faculty for
updating and sharing of their skills and knowledge with in-
dustry (Sweeney 1997).  These same employers frequently
engage more experienced faculty as consultants in planning,
research, and development efforts that are critical to their
business (Peak and O’Hara 1998).
Although both internship and consulting engagements, also
called co-operatives and fellowships, involve temporary re-
lationships between a university representative and a
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business, interning implies a different experience level than
consulting.  That is, interning generally involves a relatively
inexperienced individual, while consulting features an expe-
rienced individual.  Interns (a.k.a. “co-op students”) can be
either students or faculty, while consultants (a.k.a. “fel-
lows”) are almost always university faculty members.
The Source of University Liability
Businesses involved in university outreach relationships
formulate business performance expectations based on how
experienced or qualified they perceive the intern or consult-
ant to be (Guttmann 1976).  As a result, the university
incurs liability that is conditioned by business clients’ ex-
pectations.  This article discusses the liability incurred by
these university-sponsored relationships with the business
community and gives practical examples, as well.
General Expectations and Benefits Con-
cerning Interns
Interns are very different from consultants.  An intern is ex-
pected to be a novice while a consultant is expected to be an
expert, regardless of whether he/she holds student or faculty
status (Kelley 1981; King 1995).  Also, by definition, the
internship exists so that the intern may acquire experience
he/she is lacking (Melinda Norris 1996).  According to the
authors’ University’s guidelines, interning is a vehicle for
individuals to acquire practical experience in an area where
they have received academic training  (IS&T Internship
Guidelines 1996; IS&T Program Proposal 1995; UNO Un-
dergraduate Catalog 1996; AACSB 1996).  Using these
concepts, the parties involved in an interning relationship
will expect the student or faculty intern to be educated but to
possess only general skills or knowledge about the tasks at
hand.  Consequently, the intern is expected to be relatively
inexperienced in specific skills about those tasks.
The various parties participate in the outreach relationship
for the benefits they receive.  For instance, both student and
faculty interns benefit because they increase their market
value while they increase their business experience by
working in a real-world environment (Balakrishnan, et al.
1995).  Conversely, businesses that engage them benefit by
obtaining the services of quality, relatively low-cost indi-
viduals (Kaplan, 1994).  We will discuss these and other
benefits in greater depth below.
General Expectations and Benefits Con-
cerning Consultants
Faculty consultants can be either independent or university-
sponsored.  This article deals with the latter category.  Par-
ties involved in a consulting relationship typically expect a
consultant to possess specific, significant and relevant skills
or knowledge about the tasks at hand (Guttmann 1976; Kaye
1994).  Like interns, consultants who are simultaneously
employed as university faculty also benefits from business
experience gained working in a real-world environment.
However, since consultants are already experienced, they
often consult primarily for research and/or monetary com-
pensation (George Norris 1996).  Again, businesses that
engage consultants benefit by obtaining the services of
quality, relatively low-cost individuals, as well as numerous
other benefits.
However, despite the many benefits of interning and con-
sulting, relationships between a university’s representatives
and a client business incur liability to both parties.  In this
article, we focus on the liability incurred by a sponsoring
university and its representatives who are involved in in-
terning and consulting activities.
The Concept of Liability and Insurance
Liability is the legal responsibility of a liable party to com-
pensate an injured party for loss suffered due to the liable
party’s acts or omissions (Weinstein 1988).  Most people
think of liability as resting entirely with a defendant.  How-
ever, in situations where the plaintiff’s acts also contribute
to the harm, liability also may rest with the plaintiff.  People
who perceive liability exposure have a strong incentive to
purchase insurance.
 With a contract of insurance, the insurer bonds the insured’s
liability in exchange for payment of a policy premium.  The
insurer is obliged to provide protection to the insured, while
the insured has the legal obligation to pay the premium and
behave responsibly.  Accordingly, the university provides
protection for its representative who, renders services on
behalf of the university.  Therefore, the university may be
held liable for acts of its interns and consultants.  Liability is
especially likely when the individual materially contributes
to large losses (i.e., tail events), such as calamities caused to
the client business’ strategic planning process or to major
changes in its IT infrastructure.  The university and the cli-
ent business both may share responsibility because both
should have a degree of control over the intern.
Relative Insurability of the Consultant
We begin our discussion of university liability by examining
the insurability of the university-affiliated IT consultant,
which is a general case of the intern.  Figure 1 represents the
relative insurability of the university consultant.  The verti-
cal axis continuum shows that a business client expects the
consultant to deliver an increasing level of performance,
commensurate with an increasing level of knowledge per-
ceived by the client. There two divisions of knowledge
across this vertical continuum are: 1) Partial Knowledge,￿’#- n ￿s￿#4#
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Figure 1   - Relative Insurability of Consultants, Based on Certification and Competence (Peak and O’Hara 1998). 
which begins from a low of Ignorance and leads up to the
threshold of Competence, and continues through 2) Reason
to Know, which begins inclusive of minimal Competence
and culminates with (the theoretical) Full Knowledge.
Reason to know is a legal term that describes a region of
knowledge that is capable of producing levels of perform-
ance all the way from competent to outstanding.  The lowest
range of reason to know, located at the middle of the vertical
axis continuum, is the threshold of competent performance.
Therefore, reaching that threshold of competence indicates
that the consultant has attained minimal control or mastery
of the knowledge in his/her field and is capable of exercising
it.  Technically, reason to know is demonstrated by the acts,
the words, and the circumstances surrounding the execution
of the consultant's duties (Weinstein 1988).  Legally, the
university becomes liable when its consultant has acquired
sufficient control to reach reason to know.  Beyond mere
competence, we show Actual Knowledge as the upper range
of reason to know in Figure 1.  It represents the high level of
subjective consultant knowledge that is desired by a client.
Unfortunately, people find it difficult to objectively verify
precisely when the consultant acquires reason to know, and
even harder to objectively recognize the attainment of sub-
jective actual knowledge.
Certification, on the horizontal axis continuum, is an objec-
tive proxy, a signal, for actual knowledge.  When the
consultant is certified, i.e., graduated, he/she is recognized
as having acquired actual knowledge at that point in time.
Although competence is a minimally acceptable subjective
standard, it is certification that objectively assures the client,
via a third-party appraisal, that the consultant has attained
actual knowledge.
The liability test for competence/reason to know is substan-
tially less rigorous than for actual knowledge, because
reason to know may be established even if the consultant has
never achieved actual knowledge.  For example, merely
having been exposed to knowledge (called “receipt of no-
tice”) can trigger liability by legally establishing that the
consultant should possess the knowledge, even if he/she
never acquired it. Using an analogy, prominent publication
of a critical IT requirement in MIS
Quarterly can constitute receipt of
notice for a subscriber, triggering
liability.  This surprising dilemma
places sponsoring universities at risk for
consultants who do not pursue
continuous professional development.
The Figure 1 horizontal axis shows
Consultant Experience relative to a
continuum defined by standards of
professional certification.  The two
divisions of this continuum are: 1)
Uncertified Activity, which leads from
the left to the threshold of certification,
and 2) Certified Activity, which begins
inclusive of certification and increases
in experience level to the right.
Certification delineates a definitive,
binary condition: either the consultant is
certified or is not.  At the threshold of
certification, the consultant is certified
as competent in, and having actual
knowledge of, his/her field.
Historically, clients have shown preference for consultants
whose knowledge is certified, either by governmental licen-
sure, academic graduation, or by professional standard.
What is Valued More:
 Actual Knowledge or Certification?
In our experience, businesses value actual knowledge more
highly than certification because actual knowledge is more
closely linked with production.  Certification is valued only
as a proxy.  It is also a typical prerequisite to a legal remedy,
but since the remedy is not production it will be only reluc-
tantly pursued.  Nevertheless, a tail event caused by a
consultant could induce a business client to invoke the rem-
edy, which approximates the filing of an insurance claim.
Recognizing the university as the de facto insurer, recallLiability Issues of Internship Engagements
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Figure 1 divided relative consultant insurability into four
quadrants, starting in the upper right with Quadrant A and
reading clockwise through Quadrant D.  The reader is re-
ferred to (Peak and O’Hara) for in-depth discussion of
Figures 1 and 2.
Relative Insurability
of the Student Intern
An extension of Figure 1, Figure 2 describes the insurability
of student interns.  The axes and quadrants of Figure 2
closely correspond to those of Figure 1.  Figure 2 phases are
directly related to and therefore represent student grade lev-
els (e.g., freshman, sophomore, junior, senior), where degree
certification is granted following the final phase (phase four,
for undergraduate students) of the student’s university expe-
rience.  The vertical axis in Figure 2 plots the continuum of
the Client's Reasonable Expectation of Intern Performance,
and also plots the student intern's knowledge, progressing
from Ignorance to Full Knowledge.  The horizontal axis
plots continuum of the student Intern Experience, where the
intern's control over personal performance progresses from
Limited to Advanced.  When the intern’s experience reaches
a mid-axis level, the intern receives certification, analogous
to reaching reason to know.  Now, Figure 2 differs from Fig-
ure 1 with respect to the vertical axis, where it displays the
student’s educational progression, culminating at mid-axis
with the student’s graduation (i.e., certification of attaining
reason to know).
Summary of Intern-incurred Liability
Regardless of how many persons are involved in an intern-
ship engagement, liability flows towards all parties who
knowingly and voluntarily control the outcomes.  When an
internship results in a significantly unfavorable outcome
(e.g., a tail event), the apparent candidate for defendant is
the intern, because, by definition, the intern is inexperienced.
Realistically, however, the intern is the person least likely to
hold primarily liable by law, since the intern is the person
least likely to possess the requisite control. Under normal
circumstances, the intern's university, the client, and the fac-
ulty supervisor, in that order, bear true
primary liability. The university, in its
role as advisor and teacher, and the client
organization, in its role as employer
and/or trainer, logically should have far
greater knowledge than the intern should.
In addition, internships traditionally
feature university and/or client
supervision, so both supervising parties
should be prepared to intercept and
mitigate unfavorable outcomes.
Supervising faculty, like competent
faculty consultants, normally act from
Quadrant A in Figure 1.   Although they
are normally insurable by the sponsoring
university, Quadrant A individuals may
likely experience personal primary
liability, while Quadrant C students will
not.  In an internship, the faculty
supervisor, in effect, absorbs potential
intern liability and increases his/her own.
However, this increased exposure is, in
turn, absorbed by a shield of contractual university affilia-
tion--a shield that both protects the faculty member via
university indemnification. Even if liable, the intern and the
lone supervisor are distinctly unattractive as a defendants.
Typically, they lack substantial economic resources to fund a
court-ordered repayment.  In addition, juries historically
have sympathized with small litigants, so that plaintiffs seek
defendants with deep pockets. Therefore, the law will tend to
hold the university and/or the client liable for placement and
consequences of an incompetent intern, in the absence of
outrageous, irresponsible, or illegal acts by the intern.
Faculty interns merit additional discussion.  Despite the li-
ability shield, relatively speaking, faculty interns incur a
greater primary liability than student interns do, and they are
slightly more attractive as potential defendants.  In Figure 2,
a faculty intern occupying Quadrant C (i.e., uncertified and
incompetent) will be exposed to greater liability than a
Quadrant C student intern for a number of reasons.  First,￿’#- n ￿s￿#4#
47
faculty have the more extensive education and perceived
potential; their incompetence is less expected.  Second, fac-
ulty interns are far more likely than student interns to be
attractive defendants, in a monetary sense.  Unlike most stu-
dent interns, faculty interns will have an income and some
accumulated assets.  In addition, they are often are covered
by insurance, either through their own policies or through
university indemnification.  Third, faculty enjoy an elevated
social standing in the eyes of the community.  In court, this
elevated social standing may increase faculty liability.  For
example, if a jury recognizes that the faculty intern is oper-
ating in Quadrant C (i.e., uncertified and incompetent),
instead of Quadrant A (i.e., certified expert), the jury may
still impose the expectation that all faculty interns are un-
certified experts acting from Quadrant D.  Thus, the burden
of liability is greater for the faculty intern than the student
intern because the community views a faculty intern as a
better risk.
Why Businesses Engage Interns
The inevitable question is:  if  businesses can expect interns
to perform incompetently, then why would businesses en-
gage them?  Actually, there are many good reasons for
businesses to engage interns.  These same reasons apply to
consultants, as well.  Six reasons are that these individuals
provide the business with:
·  Temporary commitments
·  Minimal cost of benefits
·  Access to special, state-of-the-art skills
·  Support for the hirer's perspective
·  A fresh viewpoint
·  An enhanced image to peer firms and to the community
Business clients often seek out interns for temporary en-
gagements, to serve as "temporary employees" with no long-
term commitment on either side.  Temporary engagements
offer significant cost savings, which stem from reduced in-
tern training needs (in knowledge areas acquired through
university study) and near-zero employee benefit obliga-
tions.  With interns, businesses may be able to quickly
augment business operations, for example, to meet transient
demand on the firm.  The serviced transient demand can
have several origins, for example: 1) a large, one time proj-
ect (e.g., a Year 2000 project), 2) a transition period when
additional in-house training is needed or additional staff is
needed (e.g., introduction of a new software application), or
3) even a cyclical demand increase (e.g., software up-
grades).
Interns may give employers access to special, current skills
and knowledge, a primary strength of viable university in-
ternship programs (AACSB 1996; George Norris 1996).
Skills possessed by an intern may be skills not available at
the firm.  For instance, interns may provide expertise in one
skill area (e.g., systems development theory) in exchange for
on-the-job training in another (e.g., systems development
experience) (Balakrishnan, et al. 1995).  Lastly, the skill
may be in short supply (e.g., C++ skills), and the client may
use interns as a tactic for filling skill demand.
According to the “new blood” theory, interns also may pro-
vide a fresh viewpoint on the business client's array of
strengths, weaknesses, and opportunities (Gault 1996; Stroh,
et al. 1996).  Under this theory, the client seeks out interns
as part of the in-house training program, when the intern is
expected to "teach" as much or more than he/she learns.  The
"new blood" motive stems from the client's desire to intro-
duce new ideas into the organization.
The client may wish to gain support or validate a personal
perspective on a situation.  In addition, the client may wish
to appear proactive or to appear supportive of university.  A
friendly working relationship between the university, its rep-
resentatives, and the business community contributes to
mutual good will, benefiting all associated parties (AACSB
1996).
Intern Performance Oversight
A secondary benefit of the university-sponsored internship
process is that it provides the business client with  special
oversight skills, including selection and monitoring services
performed by a faculty supervisor.  Faculty internships may
require similar oversight by a department chair or an associ-
ate dean.  Interns also will require oversight by the client's
regular employees.  Based on the information collected from
each oversight process, the university can assess and adjust
its programs, benefiting future students, interns, and clients.
Internships Sponsored by Non-
university Organizations
The growing importance of internships is further evidenced
by the emergence of non-university organizations that also
sponsor internships.  These organizations may function ei-
ther as a clearinghouse or as a broker.  An organization in
our region, the Applied Information Management (AIM)
Institute, functions as both.
AIM, a consortium of academic and business organizations,
contacts businesses and encourages them to post IT intern-
ships.  Currently, more than 80 businesses post intern
positions with AIM.  These businesses will review the appli-
cant resumes provided by AIM and set up interviews with
selected candidates.  AIM also accepts unsolicited applica-
tions from individuals, recruits individuals, and conducts
career fairs to fill the vacant internships (Mills 1997).  All
parties may search company and candidate listings at the
AIM web site, located at http://www.omaha.org.Liability Issues of Internship Engagements
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In economic terminology, AIM  “makes a market” for in-
terns.  It acts as a clearinghouse, whose dimensions are
defined by client specifications.  It also acts as a broker,
matching candidate qualifications with intern jobs.  AIM
accepts applications without pre-screening them. AIM
merely facilitates the process, allowing the market itself to
equalize demand and supply.  The market is very active,
with more than three-fourths of all internships eventually
resulting in full-time employment.  Academic postings and
faculty internships are equally open (Sweeney 1997).
For example, one large company, which was not well struc-
tured to handle interns, so it seldom hired them.  With
interns, the company was legally obligated to address issues
that include job security, training, seniority, benefits, and
compensation--a process that was identical to that of its
longer-term employees.  Union issues also presented chal-
lenges.  Currently, AIM performs a placement service for
this company and pays the intern salary, while the company
reimburses AIM and still benefits from IT interns.  The
company is freed from dealing with employment issues,
while AIM opens doors for both the company to employ in-
terns and for students who have no other university-
sponsored internship opportunities.  Some internship pro-
grams at our university work with AIM, as well.
From a liability perspective, AIM internships shield the uni-
versities because AIM places screening and supervising
responsibility squarely at the feet of the employing business.
However, if an AIM internship is coupled with an academic
credit, then the university shares that liability.  Just as with
university-sponsored internships, AIM internships lower
hiring risk to participating companies.  AIM’s director notes:
“. . . (the interning of students) gives businesses a chance to
see an employee without a long-term employment contract.
It’s hard to terminate employees these days.  Internships
usually don’t have employment contracts, benefits, and so
on.  If the employer doesn’t like the intern, there is no need
for termination--the internship just ends (Sweeney 1997).”
AIM’s interning role is a result of an imperfection in the
regional job market.  First, there is a deficit in the corporate
community.  Most corporations deal with interns on an ad
hoc basis: they have not institutionalized their intern budg-
ets, interviewing and hiring techniques, policies, or
interactions with the originating colleges or universities.
Nearly all internship activities are localized at the depart-
mental level.  Second, there is a deficit in the academic
community.  Most universities have not institutionalized
their internship activities, either.  Many professions do not
require internships because supervising faculty must work
without compensation or release time.  However, internship
policies are usually loosely localized at the college or uni-
versity levels.  Colleges of Education, because of licensure
requirements, have fairly formalized procedures.  However,
in colleges frequented by IT students (e.g., engineering, IS,
computer science), internship activities are often run at the
departmental level.  There, academic internships may be
heavily dependent on the personal enthusiasm and work
ethics of the faculty supervisor.  In addition, locating an in-
ternship may depend on skills of the individual intern.
Therefore, the university greatly contributes to the success
of internships by institutionalizing them, as with many IS/IT
degree programs.  Techniques include allocating college
credit, advisory interaction between faculty advisor and cli-
ent supervisor, and through formal assessment procedures.
Demand for IS/IT Internships
The rising demand for competent IS/IT employees is fueling
the growth of internships throughout the nation.  The
Chronicle of Higher Education (June 8, 1995) found that
relative change in growth in bachelor’s degrees in IS/IT-
related fields is actually negative.  Fields experiencing
negative growth in degrees awarded included mathematics (-
11 percent), engineering (-11 percent), engineering technol-
ogy (-30 percent), computer and information sciences (-33
percent), and communications technology (-87 percent),
compared with an average change across all fields of 17
percent.
Why Internships Should not be
Mandatory for all Students
We believe that universities should avoid making internships
mandatory for several reasons.  First, the quality of the av-
erage internship opportunity is sure to decline as their
number swells to contain the entire student body.  The uni-
versity should wish to secure only meaningful learning
opportunities for its students, and mandatory internships will
defeat this objective.  Second, as the number grows, the
quality of the average intern is likely to drop.  The univer-
sity's ability to secure internship opportunities will be
directly influenced by business perceptions of intern quality.
Third, some of the university's students may be minors who
cannot participate in internships due to age, and cannot be
contractually obligated.  Fourth, university liability will in-
crease significantly on three fronts: 1) interns placed in
unsafe environments, 2) interns making errors, and
3) interns perceiving an “unreasonable” denial of an oppor-
tunity to graduate.
University Control of Intern and Consultant
Liability
A university can control its liability exposure by minimizing
the adverse effects of its interns and consultants who enjoy
the shield of university indemnity.  Since the sponsoring uni-￿’#- n ￿s￿#4#
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versity typically bears primary liability for actions of all of
these individuals, it should exercise priority control over its
risk exposure and tail event avoidance in its outreach rela-
tionships.  Hence, a well-managed university will
proactively screen and supervise all its affiliated interns and
consultants.
Each party to an outreach relationship has a degree of con-
trol over the relationship and therefore bears some potential
liability within it.  Poor communication as to assigned re-
sponsibility is often  the root cause of error, loss, and
liability.  In managing its risk, the university would do well
to alert all parties to their respective duties, controlling the
engagement outcome.  Each party experiences overlapping
scopes of authority--a situation conducive to acrimonious
strife.  Legal resolution of conflicts embedded in such a
complex environment is likely to poison the environment: a
court trial is an unfavorable context for resolving these types
of disputes and is likely to damage public relations.  As a
result, both the university and business client usually will try
to keep negotiations low-key.  Proscriptive front-end plan-
ning--where the university establishes enlightened policies,
standards, and procedures--is a far better alternative than
destructive tail-end litigation.
The university can manage and control the formal creation
of sponsored relationships.  At a minimum, a university
should require outreach relationships to be formalized with
written, signed "academic contracts." For a contract to be
legally binding, each party to the contract must have reached
the age of majority. With minors, the age of majority varies
by State, the normal age is between 18 and 21 years of age.
A separate set of problems will confront a university that is
placing minors into internship relationships.  The univer-
sity's responsibilities (read liability) will increase and the
university's ability to manage risk will decrease.  Contracts
can help reduce the impact of self-promoting promises by
will not do, as well as what the business client may reasona-
bly expect as to performance.  All academic contracts should
describe the general terms of the university/client relation-
ship, the financial terms, and the time requirements,
including the start and end dates, as well as business-hour
restrictions.  Each university should have a policy on aca-
demic contracts with the business community.  The authors
have included one a template IS/IT intern and consultant
contract in Appendix A.
Conclusion
Responsible management of  the university's internship and
consulting risks requires an explicit, initial investment of
institutional resources to establish polices and procedures
appropriate for your institution and your business clients.  It
requires a commitment to continuous improvement, since all
participants in the relationship (we hope) will be learning
from the experience.  It also requires proactive risk-
consciousness from all involved faculty and administrators.
We emphasize that this consciousness will not spontaneously
occur; it must be the result of good outreach management
(National Society for Experimental Education 1998).  In-
cluded in "good outreach management" is assuring that
internships offer a genuine opportunity for a challenging
learning environment.
We believe that academic institutions should continue to
expand their business outreach activities because of the in-
herent educational benefits.  However, by promoting more
internships and consultancies, the university simultaneously
increases the probability of a tail event.  A tail event could
result in significant financial losses for all parties, but such
an event could damage long-term relationships with business
clients, as well.  Consequently, the university has a respon-
sibility to manage these relationships with care.  Its survival
may hang in the balance.
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Template Internship Academic Contract
￿￿ *HQHUDO WHUPV RI WKH UHODWLRQVKLS ￿￿ *HQHUDO WHUPV RI WKH UHODWLRQVKLS
7KLV LV DQ DFDGHPLF FRQWUDFW EHWZHHQ WKH ,QWHUQ￿&RQVXOWDQW
￿ ￿￿ DQG WKH 8QLYHUVLW\ ￿
￿￿ DQG WKH &OLHQW ￿ ￿￿ $FWLRQV UHTXLUHG RI
WKH &OLHQW PD\ EH FRPSOHWHG E\ WKH &OLHQW 6XSHUYLVRU ￿
￿￿
7KH ,QWHUQ￿&RQVXOWDQW ￿FLUFOH RQH￿ KDV KDV QRW KDV KDV QRW DWWDLQHG WKH DJH RI
PDMRULW\￿ 7KLV LQWHUQVKLS ￿FLUFOH RQH￿ LV LV QRW LV LV QRW IRU DFDGHPLF FUHGLW￿
$OO SDUWLHV DJUHH WKDW WKH\ DUH DERXW WR HQWHU D FRPSOH[ UHODWLRQVKLS WKDW
PD\ DSSHDU WR EH D K\EULG UHODWLRQVKLS ZLWK DFDGHPLF DQG HPSOR\PHQW DVSHFWV￿ +RZ￿
HYHU￿ WKH SDUWLHV IXUWKHU DJUHH WKDW WKH DFDGHPLF UHODWLRQVKLS VKDOO EH VXSHULRU DQG VKDOO
QRW EH FRPSURPLVHG E\ DQ\ UHTXLUHPHQWV RI DQ\ VLPXOWDQHRXV HPSOR\PHQW UHODWLRQVKLS￿
)XUWKHU￿ WKH SDUWLHV DJUHH WKDW WKRVH LQ WKH DFDGHPLF UHODWLRQVKLS ZLOO QRW XQUHDVRQDEO\
IUXVWUDWH WKH REMHFWLYHV RI DQ\ HPSOR\PHQW UHODWLRQVKLS WKDW WKH ,QWHUQ￿&RQVXOWDQW PD\
KDYH UXQQLQJ VLPXOWDQHRXVO\ ZLWK WKH LQWHUQVKLS￿FRQVXOWDQF\￿ ￿127(￿ LQ WKH UHPDLQGHU
RI WKH WKLV GRFXPHQW WKH WHUPV ￿,QWHUQ￿ DQG ￿LQWHUQVKLS￿ ZLOO EH XVHG LQVWHDG RI ￿,Q￿
WHUQ￿&RQVXOWDQW￿ DQG ￿LQWHUQVKLS￿FRQVXOWDQF\￿￿￿
￿￿ )LQDQFLDO 7HUPV DQG 7LPH 5HTXLUHPHQWV ￿￿ )LQDQFLDO 7HUPV DQG 7LPH 5HTXLUHPHQWV
7KH &OLHQW VKDOO ￿D￿ SD\ WKH (UURUV DQG 2PLVVLRQV 3ROLF\ SUHPLXP ￿HVWL￿
PDWHG SUHPLXP ￿ ￿￿ ￿E￿ SD\ WKH 8QLYHUVLW\ ￿
￿
DQG ￿F￿ FRPSHQVDWH WKH ,QWHUQ DV IROORZV ￿FLUFOH WKH OHWWHU IRU DOO WKDW DSSO\ DQG ILOO LQ
EODQNV ZHUH QHFHVVDU\￿￿
5(/$7,216+,3
D￿ VROHO\ DQ DFDGHPLF UHODWLRQVKLS￿ QR HPSOR\PHQW UHODWLRQVKLS
E￿ DFDGHPLF UHODWLRQVKLS FRXSOHG ZLWK HPSOR\PHQW UHODWLRQVKLS
F￿ VROHO\ DQ HPSOR\PHQW UHODWLRQVKLS￿ PLQLPDO DFDGHPLF UHODWLRQ￿
VKLS ￿L￿H￿￿ QR UHJLVWUDWLRQ IRU DFDGHPLF FUHGLW￿￿
&203(16$7,21
G￿ ]HUR GROODUV RI FRPSHQVDWLRQ
H￿ GROODUV SHU KRXU RI FRPSHQVDWLRQ
I￿ GROODUV SHU PRQWK RI FRPSHQVDWLRQ
J￿ GROODUV SHU DFDGHPLF WHUP RI FRP￿
SHQVDWLRQ
K￿ GROODUV RI FRPSHQVDWLRQ IRU WKH
HQWLUH HQJDJHPHQW
WKHUH ￿FLUFOH RQH￿ DUH DUH QRW DUH DUH QRW DQ\
LWHP￿￿ SD\PHQW REOLJDWLRQV RI WKH FOLHQW￿
7KH 8QLYHUVLW\ VKDOO SD\ QRWKLQJ WR HLWKHU WKH &OLHQW RU WR WKH ,QWHUQ￿ XQOHVV
UHTXLUHG E\ D VHSDUDWH GRFXPHQW DWWDFKHG WR WKLV DFDGHPLF FRQWUDFW ￿VHH EHORZ￿ LWHP ￿￿
·$WWDFKHG￿ 2WKHU ’RFXPHQWV￿￿￿ 7KHUH ￿FLUFOH RQH￿ DUH DUH QRW DUH DUH QRW DQ\ LWHP￿￿ SD\PHQW
REOLJDWLRQV RI WKH 8QLYHUVLW\￿
7KH ,QWHUQ VKDOO SD\ ￿D￿ WKH QRUPDO FRVWV DVVRFLDWHG ZLWK HQUROOPHQW IRU
DFDGHPLF FUHGLW￿ ￿E￿ WKH QRUPDO FRVWV DVVRFLDWHG ZLWK WUDYHO WR DQG IURP WKH &OLHQW￿V
SODFH RI EXVLQHVV DQG￿RU WKH DJUHHG XSRQ VLWH IRU WKH LQWHUQVKLS￿ DQG ￿F￿ WKH QRUPDO
FRVWV ERUQ E\ WKH &OLHQW•V HPSOR\HHV LQ FRPSOLDQFH ZLWK WKH &OLHQW￿V UHTXLUHPHQWV ￿H￿J￿￿
GUHVV FRGHV￿￿ 7KH ,QWHUQ VKDOO KDYH QR RWKHU ILQDQFLDO REOLJDWLRQV VSULQJLQJ IURP WKLV
DFDGHPLF FRQWUDFW XQOHVV H[SOLFLWO\ UHTXLUHG E\ D VHSDUDWH GRFXPHQW DWWDFKHG WR WKLV
DFDGHPLF FRQWUDFW ￿VHH EHORZ￿ LWHP ￿￿￿ 7KHUH ￿FLUFOH RQH￿ DUH DUH QRW DUH DUH QRW DQ\ LWHP ￿
SD\PHQW REOLJDWLRQV RI WKH ,QWHUQ￿
7KLV HQJDJHPHQW VKDOO VWDUW RQ WKH GD\ RI LQ WKH \HDU
￿ 7KLV HQJDJHPHQW VKDOO HQG RQ WKH GD\ RI LQ WKH \HDU
￿ 7KLV HQJDJHPHQW FRUUHVSRQGV ZLWK WKH DFDGHPLF WHUP￿V￿ ￿
￿￿ ’HVFULSWLRQ RI UHVSRQVLELOLWLHV DQG GXWLHV￿ ￿￿ ’HVFULSWLRQ RI UHVSRQVLELOLWLHV DQG GXWLHV￿
(DFK SDUW\ DJUHHV WR FRPSOHWH WKLV DFDGHPLF FRQWUDFW DQG WR FRPSOHWH DOO RI
LWHP LQ JRRG IDLWK￿ DQG ZLWKRXW DUELWUDULQHVV RU FDSULFLRXVQHVV￿
D￿ RI WKH 8QLYHUVLW\￿ D￿ RI WKH 8QLYHUVLW\￿
7KH 8QLYHUVLW\ DJUHHV WR SURYLGH UHJXODUO\ VFKHGXOHG RII￿VLWH DQG RQ￿VLWH
DFDGHPLF VXSHUYLVLRQ RI WKH ,QWHUQ￿V DFDGHPLF SHUIRUPDQFH￿ 7KLV UHJXODUO\ VFKHGXOHG
DFDGHPLF VXSHUYLVLRQ VKDOO EH VFKHGXOHG E\ WKH $FDGHPLF 6XSHUYLVRU LQ FRQVXOWDWLRQ ZLWK
WKH &OLHQW DQG WKH ,QWHUQ￿ 1R ODWHU WKDQ WKH VWDUW RI WKH LQWHUQVKLS￿ WKH $FDGHPLF 6XSHU￿
YLVRU VKDOO GHOLYHU WR WKH ,QWHUQ DQG WR WKH &OLHQW D ZULWWHQ VFKHGXOH IRU VXFK DFDGHPLF
VXSHUYLVLRQ￿ 7KLV VFKHGXOH ￿FLUFOH RQH￿ LV LV QRW LV LV QRW DWWDFKHG XQGHU LWHP ￿￿ +RZHYHU￿
DOO SDUWLHV DJUHH WKDW WKH VXSHUYLVLRQ SURYLGHG E\ WKH &OLHQW VKRXOG EH PRUH LPPHGLDWH
DQG PRUH VLJQLILFDQW LQ WHUPV RI LPPHGLDWH HUURU GHWHFWLRQ WKDQ WKH DFDGHPLF VXSHUYL￿
VLRQ SURYLGHG E\ WKH 8QLYHUVLW\￿
7KH 8QLYHUVLW\ DJUHHV WR REWDLQ DQ (UURUV DQG 2PLVVLRQV 3ROLF\ ￿RU SROLFLHV￿
FRYHULQJ WKH ,QWHUQ DQG WKH $FDGHPLF 6XSHUYLVRU LQ WKLV HQJDJHPHQW￿ WR SURYLGH WKH
&OLHQW￿ WKH ,QWHUQ￿ DQG WKH $FDGHPLF 6XSHUYLVRU ZLWK D FRS\ RI WKH 3ROLF\￿ DQG WR ELOO WKH
&OLHQW IRU WKH SUHPLXP￿ 7KLV SROLF\ ￿FLUFOH RQH￿
LV LV QRW LV LV QRW DWWDFKHG XQGHU LWHP ￿￿
7KH 8QLYHUVLW\ DJUHHV WR SURYLGH WKH &OLHQW ZLWK IRUPV IRU HYDOXDWLQJ WKH
,QWHUQ DW WKH VFKHGXOHG FRQFOXVLRQ RI WKH LQWHUQVKLS￿ 7KHVH IRUPV ￿FLUFOH RQH￿ DUH DUH
DUH QRW DUH QRW DWWDFKHG XQGHU LWHP ￿￿
E￿ RI WKH &OLHQW￿ E￿ RI WKH &OLHQW￿
7KH &OLHQW DJUHHV WR SURYLGH D OHDUQLQJ HQYLURQPHQW ZLWK JHQXLQH UHVSRQVL￿
ELOLWLHV DSSURSULDWH IRU WKLV ,QWHUQ￿ 7KH &OLHQW DJUHHV WR PLQLPL]H LUUHOHYDQW ORZ￿OHYHO
RIILFH WDVNV ￿H￿J￿￿ SKRWRFRS\LQJ￿ DVVLJQHG WR WKH ,QWHUQ￿ 7KH &OLHQW DJUHHV WR SURYLGH
WKH ,QWHUQ ZLWK WLPHO\ DQG VLJQLILFDQW RQ￿VLWH VXSHUYLVLRQ RI WKH ,QWHUQ￿V SHUIRUPDQFH￿
LQFOXGLQJ WLPHO\ DQG VLJQLILFDQW IHHGEDFN RQ DQG JXLGDQFH IRU WKH ,QWHUQ￿V SHUIRUPDQFH￿
$W WKH VFKHGXOHG FRQFOXVLRQ RI WKH LQWHUQVKLS￿ WKH &OLHQW DJUHHV WR SURYLGH WKH ,QWHUQ￿
WKH $FDGHPLF 6XSHUYLVRU￿ DQG WKH 8QLYHUVLW\ K D ZULWWHQ HYDOXDWLRQ RI WKH ,QWHUQ￿V SHU￿
IRUPDQFH￿ 7KH &OLHQW￿V HYDOXDWLRQ ZLOO EH RQ IRUPV VXSSOLHG E\ WKH 8QLYHUVLW\￿
F￿ RI WKH ,QWHUQ￿ F￿ RI WKH ,QWHUQ￿
7KH ,QWHUQ LV H[SHFWHG WR GHYRWH QR OHVV WKDQ WRWDO KRXUV
DQG QR PRUH WKDQ WRWDO KRXUV ZRUNLQJ DW ￿UHSRUW WR DGGUHVV￿
DV DVVLJQHG E\ WKH &OLHQW￿ $GGLWLRQDOO\￿ WKH ,QWHUQ LV H[SHFWHG
WR GHYRWH QR OHVV WKDQ WRWDO KRXUV DQG QR PRUH WKDQ
WRWDO KRXUV ZRUNLQJ DW WKH 8QLYHUVLW\ DV DVVLJQHG E\ WKH $FDGHPLF 6XSHUYLVRU￿
7KH ,QWHUQ LV H[SHFWHG WR KRQRU WKH &OLHQW￿V ZRUN VFKHGXOH UHTXLUHPHQWV￿
GUHVV FRGHV￿ DQG RWKHU UHTXLUHPHQWV IRU HPSOR\HHV DW WKLV OHYHO RI HQJDJHPHQW￿ 7KH
&OLHQW￿V GUHVV FRGH LV LV QRW LV LV QRW RWKHU WKDQ QRUPDO EXVLQHVV GUHVV￿ 7KH &OLHQW￿V GUHVV
FRGH LV LV QRW LV LV QRW DWWDFKHG XQGHU LWHP ￿￿ $WWDFKHG￿ 2WKHU ’RFXPHQWV￿
￿￿ ’HVFULSWLRQ RI 2EMHFWLYHV DQG ’HOLYHUDEOHV ￿￿ ’HVFULSWLRQ RI 2EMHFWLYHV DQG ’HOLYHUDEOHV
7KH REMHFWLYH RI WKLV DFDGHPLF FRQWUDFW LV WR SURYLGH WKH ,QWHUQ ZLWK D UHDO￿
ZRUOG FRQWH[W IRU WKH DSSOLFDWLRQ DQG UHILQHPHQW RI H[LVWLQJ NQRZOHGJH DQG VNLOOV￿ DV ZHOO
DV IRVWHULQJ WKH GHYHORSPHQW RI QHZ NQRZOHGJH DQG QHZ VNLOOV DSSURSULDWH WR WKLV ,QWHUQ￿
7KH &OLHQW VKDOO SURYLGH WKH ,QWHUQ D ZRUN VSDFH LQFOXGLQJ ￿FLUFOH DOO WKDW
DSSO\￿ GHVN￿ WHOHFRPPXQLFDWLRQV￿ FRPSXWHU￿ VRIWZDUH￿ LQWHUQHW DFFHVV￿ WRROV￿ DQG RWKHU
’HOLYHUDEOHV E\ WKH &OLHQW WR WKH ,QWHUQ ￿FLUFOH RQH￿ GR GR QRW GR GR QRW LQFOXGH LQWHOOHFWXDO
SURSHUW\￿ DQG RZQHUVKLS RI VXFK SURSHUW\ ￿FLUFOH RQH￿ LV LV QRW LV LV QRW SURYLGHG IRU LQ ,WHP ￿￿
7KH &OLHQW VKDOO SURYLGH WKH 8QLYHUVLW\ DQG WKH ,QWHUQ D ZULWWHQ HYDOXDWLRQ RQ
IRUPV VXSSOLHG E\ WKH 8QLYHUVLW\ ￿VHH DOVR LWHP ￿￿E￿ DERYH￿￿
7KH ,QWHUQ VKDOO KDYH WZR VHWV RI GHOLYHUDEOHV￿ RQH IRU WKH &OLHQW DQG RQH
IRU WKH 8QLYHUVLW\￿
7KH ,QWHUQ￿V GHOLYHUDEOHV WR WKH &OLHQW DUH ￿ ’HOLYHUDEOHV E\ WKH ,QWHUQ WR WKH
&OLHQW ￿FLUFOH RQH￿ GR GR QRW GR GR QRW LQFOXGH LQWHOOHFWXDO SURSHUW\￿ DQG RZQHUVKLS RI VXFK
SURSHUW\ ￿FLUFOH RQH￿ LV LV QRW LV LV QRW SURYLGHG IRU LQ ,WHP ￿￿
7KH ,QWHUQ￿V GHOLYHUDEOHV WR WKH 8QLYHUVLW\ DUH IRU DFDGHPLF HYDOXDWLRQ DQG
DUH
’HOLYHUDEOHV E\ WKH ,QWHUQ WR WKH 8QLYHUVLW\ ￿FLUFOH RQH￿ GR GR QRW GR GR QRW LQFOXGH LQWHOOHFWXDO
SURSHUW\￿ DQG RZQHUVKLS RI VXFK SURSHUW\ ￿FLUFOH RQH￿ LV LV QRW LV LV QRW SURYLGHG IRU LQ ,WHP
￿￿
7KH 8QLYHUVLW\ VKDOO GHOLYHU WR WKH &OLHQW ￿D￿ D FRS\ RI WKH (UURUV DQG 2PLV￿
VLRQV 3ROLF\ LQFOXGLQJ D ELOO IRU WKH H[DFW SUHPLXP￿ ￿E￿ D ZULWWHQ VFKHGXOH IRU DFDGHPLF
VXSHUYLVLRQ￿ ￿F￿ DQ ,QWHUQ WUDLQHG WR WKH OHYHO DSSURSULDWH IRU WKLV HQJDJHPHQW￿ DQG ￿G￿
￿ ’HOLYHUDEOHV E\ WKH
8QLYHUVLW\ WR WKH &OLHQW ￿FLUFOH RQH￿ GR GR QRW GR GR QRW LQFOXGH LQWHOOHFWXDO SURSHUW\￿ DQG￿’#- n ￿s￿#4#
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RZQHUVKLS RI VXFK SURSHUW\ ￿FLUFOH RQH￿ LV LV QRW LV LV QRW SURYLGHG IRU LQ ,WHP ￿￿
￿￿ $GKHVLRQ WHUPV ￿￿ $GKHVLRQ WHUPV
7KH DUH VRPH WHUPV ZKLFK WKH 8QLYHUVLW\ PXVW KDYH LQ DOO DFDGHPLF FRQWH[WV￿
)LUVW DPRQJ WKHVH LV $FDGHPLF )UHHGRP￿ $GGLWLRQDOO\￿ WKH 8QLYHUVLW\ LV ERXQG WR LWV
&KDUWHU DQG %\ODZV￿ ZKLFK DUH KHUHE\ LQFRUSRUDWHG E\ UHIHUHQFH￿ ￿&RSLHV PD\ EH RE￿
WDLQHG E\ FRQWDFWLQJ WKH 8QLYHUVLW\￿V &RUSRUDWH 6HFUHWDU\ DW ￿ ￿
￿￿ ￿
￿￿ (UURUV DQG 2PLVVLRQV 3ROLF\ ￿￿ (UURUV DQG 2PLVVLRQV 3ROLF\
3ULRU WR WKH VWDUW RI WKH ,QWHUQ￿V HQJDJHPHQW XQGHU WKLV DFDGHPLF FRQWUDFW￿
WKH $FDGHPLF ’HDQ VKDOO VHFXUH DQG WKH %XVLQHVV &OLHQW VKDOO SD\ IRU DQ (UURUV DQG
2PLVVLRQV 3ROLF\ ￿RU SROLFLHV￿ FRYHULQJ WKH DFWLRQV RI WKH ,QWHUQ DQG WKH $FDGHPLF
6XSHUYLVRU￿
￿￿ /LTXLGDWHG ’DPDJHV &ODXVH ￿￿ /LTXLGDWHG ’DPDJHV &ODXVH
$OO SDUWLHV DJUHH WKDW DQ LQWHUQVKLS LV IUDXJKW ZLWK SRWHQWLDO ORVVHV DQG WKDW
VXFK ORVVHV W\SLFDOO\ DUH PLQLPDO EXW RFFDVLRQDOO\ FDQ EH VXEVWDQWLDO￿ 6XEVWDQWLDO
ORVVHV DUH SDUWLFXODUO\ OLNHO\ ZKHQ WKH ,QWHUQ LV DFWLQJ DW WKH IULQJH RI WKH ,QWHUQ￿V NQRZO￿
HGJH EDVH DQG ZKHQ DFWLQJ DW WKH &OLHQW￿V VLWH￿ 6LQFH WKH SULPDU\ REMHFWLYH RI WKLV
LQWHUQVKLS LV HGXFDWLRQDO￿ QRW FRPPHUFLDO￿ WKH SDUWLHV DJUHH WKDW HDFK SDUW\ ZLOO EH
UHVSRQVLEOH IRU KLV￿KHU RZQ DWWRUQH\V￿ IHHV DQG ZLOO RQO\ EH HQWLWOHG WR UHFRYHU OLTXLGDWHG
GDPDJHV LQ DQ DPRXQW QR JUHDWHU WKDQ SD\PHQWV PDGH E\ WKH UHFRYHULQJ SDUW\ SXUVXDQW
WR LWHP ￿ RI WKLV DFDGHPLF FRQWUDFW DQG QRW LQFOXGLQJ DQ\ SD\PHQWV OLVWHG XQGHU LWHP ￿￿
￿￿ $WWDFKHG￿ 2WKHU ’RFXPHQWV ￿￿ $WWDFKHG￿ 2WKHU ’RFXPHQWV
7KH IROORZLQJ GRFXPHQWV DUH DWWDFKHG WR WKLV DFDGHPLF FRQWUDFW DQG PDGH D
SDUW RI WKLV DFDGHPLF FRQWUDFW￿
D￿ &RQWDFW ,QIRUPDWLRQ 6KHHW ￿DWWDFKHG DW WKH HQG RI WKLV IRUP￿ D￿ &RQWDFW ,QIRUPDWLRQ 6KHHW ￿DWWDFKHG DW WKH HQG RI WKLV IRUP￿
E￿ E￿
F￿ F￿
G￿ G￿
H￿ H￿
I￿ I￿
J￿ J￿
K￿ K￿
L￿ L￿
M￿ M￿
N￿ N￿
O￿ O￿
￿￿ &KRLFH RI /DZ DQG &KRLFH RI )RUXP ￿￿ &KRLFH RI /DZ DQG &KRLFH RI )RUXP
7KLV DFDGHPLF FRQWUDFW￿ DQG DQ\ QHFHVVDU\ DQG UHODWHG LQWHUSUHWDWLRQ RI WKH
LWHP ￿￿ VKDOO EH FRQWUROOHG E\ WKH ODZ RI WKH
6WDWH RI DQG DOO ODZVXLWV VKDOO EH FRPPHQFHG
DQG FRQGXFWHG LQ WKH &RXUW ORFDWHG LQ
&RXQW\ RI WKH VDPH 6WDWH￿
￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ 6LJQDWXUHV￿ 7KLV DFDGHPLF FRQWUDFW LV QRW HIIHFWLYH XQWLO DOO VLJQDWXUHV KDYH EHHQ
DIIL[HG DQG XQWLO WKH VWXGHQW KDV FRPSOLHG ZLWK DOO RWKHU QRUPDO UHJLVWUDWLRQ SURFHGXUHV￿
(DFK RI WKH SDUWLHV DJUHHV WR DFFHSW DV YDOLG D VLJQDWXUH RI DQ\ RWKHU SDUW\ RQ D FRS\ RI
WKLV DFDGHPLF FRQWUDFW WUDQVPLWWHG E\ D IDFVLPLOH PDFKLQH￿
,QWHUQ RU &RQVXOWDQW ,QWHUQ RU &RQVXOWDQW GDWH GDWH
%XVLQHVV &OLHQW %XVLQHVV &OLHQW GDWH GDWH
$FDGHPLF 6XSHUYLVRU $FDGHPLF 6XSHUYLVRU￿ ￿ GDWH GDWH
$FDGHPLF ’HDQ $FDGHPLF ’HDQ GDWH GDWH
                                                       
1
The Academic Supervisor of a Student Intern is the faculty member
of record who is responsible for assigning the academic grade for the
internship.  The Academic Supervisor for a Faculty Intern or a Fac-
ulty Consultant is the faculty member's Department Chair.  When
the Department Chair is the Faculty Intern or Faculty Consultant,
then the Dean is the Academic Supervisor.
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6WXGHQW ,GHQWLILFDWLRQ 1XPEHU￿ ￿ ￿
$FDGHPLF 7HUP RI 5HJLVWUDWLRQ <($5
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